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MAQĀŠID AL-SHARĪ'AH, IJTIHAD AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL

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THE International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia have great pleasure in jointly presenting Occasional Paper 20 *Maqāṣid al-Shari‘ah, Ijtihad and Civilisational Renewal*. The author, Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali, is a well-known scholar and specialist in this field.

*Maqāṣid al-shari‘ah* refers to the higher ideals and objectives of Islamic Law which in the opinion of the IIIT forms an important yet neglected area of Islamic Law, particularly relevant to address current and real challenges facing Muslims living both in Muslim societies and as minorities. For Islamic rulings to fulfil their purposes of justice, equality, human rights, development, and civility in today’s context, implementation of *maqāṣid al-shari‘ah* is vital. The field highlights human welfare as the ultimate purpose of all Islamic rulings and stresses its importance, while basing itself on the foundational postulates of Islamic faith and scripture.

It is for this reason as well as the paucity of works in the English language on the subject of *maqāṣid al-shari‘ah* that the IIIT decided to fill the vacuum by initiating the translation and publication of a series of books on *al-Maqāṣid* to introduce this important and difficult area of thought to English readers. These include to date, *Ibn Ashur: Treatise on Maqāṣid al-Shari‘ah, Imam al-Shāṭibi’s Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law* by Ahmad al-Raysuni, *Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law: Maqāṣid al-Shari‘ah a Functional Approach* by Gamal Eldin Attia, and *Maqasid al-Shari‘ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach* by Jasser Auda.

**FOREWORD**
As the topic is complex and intellectually challenging, with most books appearing on the subject written mainly for specialists, scholars and intellectuals alone, the IIIT London Office is also producing other simple introductory guides to the subject as part of its Occasional Papers series with a view to providing easily accessible material for the general reader. These include *Maqāṣīd al-Sharīʿah: A Beginner’s Guide*, *The Islamic Vision of Development in the Light of Maqāṣīd al-Sharīʿah* by Muhammad Umer Chapra and *Maqāṣīd al-Sharīʿah Made Simple* by Mohammad Hashim Kamali.

Where dates are cited according to the Islamic calendar (hijrah) they are labelled AH. Otherwise they follow the Gregorian calendar and are labelled CE where necessary. Arabic words are italicised except for those which have entered common usage. Diacritical marks have been added only to those Arabic names not considered modern.

The IIIT, established in 1981, has served as a major center to facilitate serious scholarly efforts based on Islamic vision, values and principles. The Institute’s programs of research, seminars and conferences during the last thirty years have resulted in the publication of more than four hundred titles in English and Arabic, many of which have been translated into other major languages.

Founded in 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia is a non-profit, independent research institute, dedicated to objective academic research with practical policy-relevant implications on Islam and contemporary issues of concern to Malaysia, the Muslim world, and Islam’s engagement with other civilisations. IAIS Malaysia publishes a quarterly international peer-reviewed journal, *Islam and Civilisational Renewal* (ICR), and books, monographs, and Occasional Paper Series, as well as convening seminars and conferences on contemporary topics with special reference to Islam.

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Maqāṣid al-Shārīʿah, Ijtihād and Civilisational Renewal

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This essay develops the idea of a maqāṣid-based framework for ijtihād and civilisational renewal (taqdīd ḥaḍārī), a broad and engaging prospect that also involves a review and reappraisal of the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence relating to both the maqāṣid and ijtihād. The author argues that this would enable Muslims to widen the scope and horizon of the maqāṣid or objectives of Islamic law from their currently legalistic leanings towards the wider perspective of civilisational renaissance. The nexus that needs to be developed between the maqāṣid and ijtihād also needs to be supported by a credible methodology, which is what the author has attempted to provide in the following pages.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The maqāṣid of the Shārīʿah naturally reflect on the Shārīʿah itself in that the goals of the Shārīʿah arise from the Shārīʿah and are in many ways affected by developments in the Shārīʿah itself, the history of ijtihād, and major developments in the applied law and custom of society. Developments relating to the āhkām (legal rules), ijtihād and fatwas have largely been influenced by the minutiae of fiqh writings that focused on particular cases and incidents at the expense sometimes of the broader goals and purposes of the Shārīʿah. Similarly, the textualist orientations of fiqh are manifested in the legal theory of usūl al-fiqh and both remained focused on analysing the text at the expense often of the overall goal and objective of the Shārīʿah. Theoretical expatiation into the higher purposes of the law and the quest to explore the intent of the Lawgiver were generally not encouraged. The maqṣid or purpose of the text was only recognised when the text declared it as such, a position which to all intents and purposes extended the textualist approach of usūl al-fiqh.
also to the *maqāṣid.* The onset of *taqlīd* (indiscriminate imitation), which advised unquestioning adherence to the authority of the past jurists and imams, added to the problem. The *maqāṣid*-based approach was consequently marginalised so much so that many a reputable text of *uṣūl al-fiqh* did not even assign a section or chapter to the study of the *maqāṣid,* and it was not until al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) that the *maqāṣid* were treated as a credible theme in its own right, and an instrument also of flexibility within the *corpus juris* of the Shariʿah. However, the *maqāṣid* still remained marginal to the mainstream *uṣūl al-fiqh,* but made a comeback only in the latter part of the twentieth century.

It is due to their focus on real life issues of vital concern to people’s welfare that the *maqāṣid* became the focus of renewed attention in recent decades, attested by numerous doctoral dissertations, books, and conferences that sought to further develop this important chapter of the Shariʿah. A mere glance at the five essential *maqāṣid,* namely life, intellect, religion, property and family, shows that the *maqāṣid* are concerned with protection of basic values of interest to all human beings. This is a different approach to that of the *uṣūl al-fiqh* that proposes certain methodologies for *ijtihad* of relevance only indirectly to the protection of basic values. In its long history of development, the *uṣūl* methodology has also become burdened with technicality and literalism.

Researchers have in recent decades focused on exploring the utility and relevance of the *maqāṣid* to constitutional law and government as well as to criminal law, family law and more specific issues of concern to Islamic finance, genetic engineering and so forth. This is accompanied by an awareness that the methodologies of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *ijtihad* are, on the whole, predicated on medieval society values, retrospective, and somewhat slow to relate effectively to modern legislative processes, science, technology, industry and commerce. By contrast, the *maqāṣid* are goals and purposes that look to the future and permit innovative approaches to the Shariʿah and contemporary issues. To speak, for instance, of *ijmaʿ* (general consensus), *qiyās* (analogical reasoning) and *istiḥsān* (juristic preference), one is likely to be involved in technicalities and methodological
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details. Maqāṣid are inherently dynamic by comparison and open to growth in tandem with changing conditions, just as they also strike a closer note with the contemporary human rights discourse. The Muslim world is currently witnessing a growing support for accountability, good governance, democracy and human rights, and the maqāṣid are seen to be offering a preferable approach to that of the usūl methodologies to meet the demand of healthy adjustment within the fabric of the Shari‘ah.

Beginning with the meaning and definition of maqāṣid and a brief review of its allied expressions such as hikmah, ‘illah, and maṣlaḥah, this article proceeds with a note on the relevance of maqāṣid to civilisational renewal (tajdīd haḍārī). Next follows a review of the Qur’an and Sunnah with special reference to their rule-based passages, namely the āyāt al-ahkām and aḥādīth al-ahkām. A question is posed whether the placement of Qur’an verses and hadith into these categories could also be made based on the objective and purpose (maqāṣid) of a particular text, whether of the Qur’an or hadith. An affirmative answer to this question would mean that a new branch of maqāṣid-based tafsīr and hadith can be developed, and a good place to start this may be to take a fresh look into the relevant segments of an existing genre of tafsīr, namely the thematic tafsīr (tafsīr mawādī‘), as will be explained. This would help ascertain the place of maqāṣid not only in Qur’an interpretation but also as valid criteria of hukm of the Qur’an and hadith. To link the maqāṣid thus directly to āyāt al-ahkām and aḥādīth al-ahkām could also address and overcome the historical marginalisation and neglect of maqāṣid in the legal theory of usūl al-fiqh. Then I expound the development of maqāṣid themselves through the reading in the first place of the clear text (naṣṣ), and then through juristic reasoning (ijtihād). The latter may consist in turn of inductive reasoning (istiqrā‘), istidlāl and ‘aql (human intellect, unrestricted reasoning respectively), and then also of innate human nature (al-fitrah) that resembles natural law and natural justice in western jurisprudence. Then I turn to the prospects of widening the scope of maqāṣid, from a designated list of the five essentials (darūriyyāt), to a basically open chapter of the Shari‘ah that could evolve in tandem with the progress of science and
civilisation. The basic hypothesis of this research is thus to expound, from the Islamic jurisprudential perspective, the uses of *maqāṣid* and *ijtihad* as instruments of civilisational renewal. The article ends with a conclusion and recommendations.

**MEANING AND DEFINITION OF MAQĀṢID**

*Maqāṣid* (singular: *maqṣid*) refers to the goals and purposes of the Shari‘ah either generally (i.e. *al-maqāṣid al-ʿāmmah*), or in reference to its particular themes and subjects (*al-maqāṣid al-khāṣṣah*). Three other Arabic words that occur in the relevant literature of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and convey similar meanings to *maqāṣid* are *ḥikmah* (wisdom), *ʿillah* (effective cause/ratio legis), and *mašlahah* (interest, benefit) respectively. A brief review of these is followed by the definition of *maqāṣid*.

*Ḥikmah* in the sense of wisdom looks toward the positive end or purpose of conduct, and in the works of Muslim jurists it usually refers to the wisdom and end-result of legislation, accomplishment of a desired benefit or its perfection. *Ḥikmah* (pl. *ḥikam*) may signify a beneficial consequence of the Shari‘ah as a whole, or of a particular ruling thereof. It also signifies the objective of legislation, in which case, *ḥikmah* would be synonymous to *maqṣid*. It is unusual, however, to use *maqṣid* or *maqāṣid* in reference to God the Most High, such as *maqāṣid Allāh*, although *maqāṣid al-Shāriʿ*—objectives of the Law-Giver—is commonplace, which is why Muslim jurists normally use *ḥikmah* in reference to Allāh. One can, of course, use both *ḥikmah* and *maqṣid* almost interchangeably in reference to the Shari‘ah.¹

ʿ*Illah* signifies two meanings, namely *cause*, as in *cause and effect*, but also more technically in the context of legislation it refers to the effective cause and attribute of a ruling (*ḥukm*) of the Shari‘ah for which it was legislated. For al-ʿĀmidī (d. 1233), ʿ*illah* refers to the effective cause, or the *ḥikmah* and benefit the Lawgiver has considered in introducing a law.² This evidently brings ʿ*illah* very close to *maqṣid*, as per Mustafa al-Ẓarqa who wrote: “ʿ*illah* could signify the *ḥikmah* of legislation in reference to the attraction of benefit or prevention of harm that may be sought through a legal command or prohibition.”³ This would equate ʿ*illah* to *maqṣid* and make it
synonymous with the goal and objective, or ghāyah, of the Shari‘ah.

I may add, however, that ‘illah is normally tied to the existing text and status quo of the law, whereas ḥikmah in the sense of end-result and purpose looks equally to the present and future and is also not so closely tied to the specificities of the text. In their discussions of the ‘illah of analogy (qiyās) the usūl scholars have stated that ‘illah must be constant and unchangeable (munḍabit) whereas ḥikmah need not meet this qualification.4

The usūl writers have used maṣlahah almost interchangeably with maqṣid and many have considered them as convergent and coterminous. I shall have occasion later to draw a distinction between maṣlahah and maqṣid, but here I note that the tendency of equating these two concepts is partially accountable for the marginalisation of maqāṣid in mainstream usūl al-fiqh. From an essentialist viewpoint, there is no objection, of course, as maṣāliḥ and maqāṣid are parallel concepts and look at basically the same values. Yet we also know that maṣlahah, especially the unrestricted maṣlahah (maṣlahah mursalah) became controversial in usūli thought as it represented a certain departure from the textualist proclivities usūl al-fiqh. Only the Mālikī School recognised maṣlahah as a source of law in its own right, but all the other schools gave it partial recognition and stipulated it with many conditions. The substance of the scholastic critique of maṣlahah is based on the specious argument, as many have advanced, that the muṣūs of Qur’an and Sunnah encapsulate most, if not all, the benefits and that a maṣlahah outside this sphere can only be recognised if it can be connected to a recognised principle of Shari‘ah. Maṣlahah mursalah would in this way be likely to be reduced to a form of analogical reasoning (qiyās). This is the substance basically of the Shāfi‘ī critique of maṣlahah mursalah. Now to equate the maqāṣid with maṣāliḥ, as is the case with mainstream usūl al-fiqh, one would be indirectly inviting the polemics of maṣlahah also to the maqāṣid and the tendency thereby to subsume the latter under the rubric of the usūli thought and methodology, which would clearly undermine the place and prominence of maqāṣid as a distinctive source and chapter of Shari‘ah in its own right.5
Early pioneers of the *maqāsid*, such as Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 1262), and al-Shāṭibī who wrote on the *maqāsid* did not attempt a definition for it on the assumption perhaps of the linguistic clarity of the word itself. This can no longer be an adequate explanation due mainly to the sheer scope and diversity of writings on the subject that has developed ever since, both in the Arabic and other languages. Hence the need for a definition, which was, however belatedly, attempted by twentieth-century scholars such as Ibn Ashur, Allal al-Fasi, al-Qaradawi, al-Zuhayli and others, who defined the *maqāsid* and also stipulated a number of conditions a valid *maqāsid* must meet.

Al-Rāysuni who wrote a book on al-Shāṭibī’s theory of the *maqāsid* concurred that it was due most likely to the linguistic clarity of *maqāsid* that such a prominent contributor to the subject did not attempt a definition. The renowned hadith-cum-legal maxim, *al-umūru bi-maṣūdiḥā* (human affairs are judged by reference to their purposes) was commonplace and frequently cited from early times.6

Ibn Ashur (d. 1973) defined the general objectives (*maqāsid āmmah*) of the Shariʿah as “the deeper meanings (*maʿāni*) and inner wisdom (*ḥikam*) that the Lawgiver has contemplated in respect of all or most of the Shariʿah ordinances […].”7 Allal al-Fasi (d. 1964) also defined the *maqāsid* as “the hidden meanings (*al-ʿasrār*) and wisdom that the Lawgiver has considered in the enactment of all of the Shariʿah ordinances.”8 The two definitions differ only slightly in that according to al-Fasi none of the laws of the Shariʿah is without a purpose, whereas Ibn Ashur put it that “all or most of the Shariʿah ordinances” have their purposes. Al-Fasi’s usage of “hidden meanings – *al-ʿasrār*” invites criticism as it would fail to meet Ibn Ashur’s four conditions that the general goals of the Shariʿah must qualify. These are: firm, evident, general, and exclusive (*thābit, ẓāhir, ʿāmm, ṭard*). Other jurists have generally concurred with the analysis that virtually all of the laws of the Shariʿah have their purposes; the doubt emerges, however, whether they are all known to us, since they are not always declared in the clear text.9
Al-Qaradawi noted that “maqāsid al-shari‘ah consist of the attraction of benefits (al-mašālih) to the people and repelling of harm and corruption (al-maḍār wa al-mafṣid) from them.” Muhammad al-Zuhayli has given a more detailed definition of maqāsid as “the ultimate goals, aims, consequences and meanings which the Shari‘ah has upheld and established through its laws, and consistently seeks to realise, materialise and achieve them at all times and places.” Maqāsid, according to al-Ra‘ūsuni, signify “the end-goals for which the Shari‘ah has been promulgated, namely to realise benefit (mašlahah) for God’s servants.”

Technicalities apart, almost all the definitions of maqāsid reviewed above are focused on realisation of benefits for human beings, that is, for the individual and society, indeed for all people, regardless of any distinction of status, colour and creed, both in this life and the Hereafter. The benefits/interests include temporal and utilitarian interests of concern to the material, moral and spiritual aspects of human life in this world and the next. Protection of religion is one of the essential maqāsid, yet our general reading of the source evidence informs us that the lives and properties (also among the essential maqāsid) of non-Muslims are sacrosanct and that justice and fair dealing under the Shari‘ah are inclusive of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Islam also recognises the basic freedom of religion and the validity in principle of all monotheistic faiths, which would therefore fall under the protective cover of maqāsid. Maqāsid can thus subsume all monotheistic religions as well as the contemporary human rights law, albeit with minor reservations.

**MAQĀSID IN THE QUR’AN: TEXT AND INTERPRETATION**

This section presents an overview of the maqāsid-based orientations of the qur’anic language, and then a discussion as to how this tendency could be reflected into the legal verses and interpretation of the Holy Book.

The Qur’an is expressive in numerous places of the benefits, goals and purposes of its messages. The Qur’an characterises itself as
“guidance and mercy” (hudan wa rahmatan) (10:57) and the prophethood of Muhammad as “a mercy to the worlds” (21:107). Mercy and rahmah also characterise the most favourite of all the 99 Excellent Names of God: these are al-Rahmān and al-Rahīm (Most Merciful, Most Compassionate), both of which signify that compassion (rahmah) is a cardinal goal and purpose of Islam. More specifically, the purpose of the law of retaliation (qiṣāṣ) in the Qur’an is to protect life (2:179); the purpose of jihad is to fight injustice (22:39); the purpose of prayer is to repel immorality and evil (29:45), and of the alms tax is to prevent circulation of wealth in the hands only of the rich (59:7). The same can be said of the prohibitive injunctions of the text that seek to protect people against harm, prejudice and injustice.

The frequent invocations in the Qur’an for people to think and exercise their reason especially for those who possess knowledge (4:83), prompted the Prophet to speak in condemnation of those who “utter the Qur’an without ever letting it (its meaning) go down their throat.”13 The purpose is to provide guidance, as one observer put it: “the cardinal objective of Qur’an that runs through the entire text is to provide guidance to individuals and societies, to educate, improve and reform the people, to enable them to build the earth.”14

The development of the genre in Qur’an interpretation known as tafsīr mawdū‘ī (thematic interpretation), which seeks to consolidate isolated verses into thematic clusters, signified a step towards the development of a goal-oriented tafsīr. The thematic tafsīr proceeds on the assumption of an essential unity of a number of verses throughout the text on the one and the same subject. The question to pose now is how this unity of theme and content can be reflected into the legislative contents of the Qur’an.15

The āyāt al-aḥkām, numbered at about 350 (out of the total of 6,235) verses had to be confined to a limited number due to the somewhat restrictive criteria of their selection. The rule-based verses were thus identified as ones with a practical import that sought to regulate the manifest and practical aspects of human conduct. This is because legal ordinances are typically concerned with commands
and prohibitions that relate to the externalities of conduct and their provable consequences. The āyāt al-aḥkām were thus confined to practical rulings (aḥkām ḍamāli) whose violation could also be proved by admissible evidence. But since the Qur’ān was not meant to be a law book but a source of moral and spiritual guidance, one could conceive its rule-based verses somewhat differently to incorporate, for instance, not only practical rulings, but also verses and sections of the Qur’ān on the essence of faith, prophethood, moral themes, encouragement and warning (tārhib wa tarhib), stories and parables and matters of concern to the hereafter and so forth that share a common purpose. All of these could become part of the data that could justify extraction of the āyāt al-aḥkām from a much wider selection of verses.16

The taṣfīr mawḍū‘ī approach brings us closer to the idea of constructing a maqāṣid-based taṣfīr. One can unite, in other words, the thematic and maqāṣid-based approaches together through an effort that integrates unity of purpose into thematic unity, thus enhancing the maqāṣidī content of mawḍū‘ī, or better still, attempt a taṣfīr maqāṣidī as a new genre of taṣfīr. Note also that thematic taṣfīr is itself a late-comer to the genres of existing taṣfīr, and it is of interest to us here simply because identification of goal and purpose can only be done with a full knowledge of the theme and subject-matter in the first place, and our taṣfīr maqāṣidī can be seen as complementary and supportive of the existing works. The wider framework proposed here for identification of the āyāt al-aḥkām would permit in turn, the moral and spiritual teachings of the Qur’ān as well as its historical narratives and parables to enrich our enquiry into the identification of maqāṣid.17

A word is in order here on the subject of ratiocination, which is concerned, in the usūl literature, with identifying the rationale and ‘illah of a ruling of the text, which some would say is not very different to that of identifying the goal and purpose of the text. However, when one looks into the juristic technicalities of ta‘lil and the restrictive approaches the usūl scholars have taken towards it, both the rational and maqāṣidī purport of the text tend to be diluted and minimised under the heavy weight of literalism with the overall
effect of keeping legal reasoning and ijtihad closely aligned with the literalist readings of the text.\textsuperscript{18}

The \textit{uṣūlī} discourse on the identification of effective cause or \textit{'illah} of a ruling, known as \textit{masālik al-'illah}, draws a distinction between \textit{'illah} and \textit{ḥikmah}, validising the former and disqualifying the latter: the \textit{'illah} must be constant and unchangeable (\textit{mundaybit}), but the \textit{ḥikmah} is changeable and therefore fails to provide a reliable basis of \textit{ḥukm} and legislation. The \textit{ḥikmah}, although essentially more logical, is thus not accepted as a substitute for \textit{'illah}. To illustrate, the Qur’an grants the traveller during the fasting month a concession not to fast, but to observe it when he is no longer travelling. The \textit{'illah} of this concession is deemed to be the fact of travelling itself, and not as it were, the hardship that it involves, on the analysis that people tend to vary in their tolerance of hardship. Hence hardship, although the effective cause and \textit{ḥikmah} of the concession, is disqualified and travelling itself is identified as the ‘correct’ \textit{'illah}. To take a \textit{maqāsidī} approach to the identification of \textit{'illah}, it is proposed that the \textit{ḥikmah} should in principle be accepted as a substitute to \textit{'illah}. The purpose of the concession in question is evidently to prevent hardship, and travelling itself can sometimes become (as in our times of fast and comfortable means of transport) rather a juristic façade and less than satisfactory for it to be a valid \textit{'illah}.

\section*{MAQĀŚID AND SUNNAH}

What has been said concerning a \textit{maqāsidī} approach to Qur’anic laws, and more specifically to the identification of \textit{āyāt al-ḥākīm}, can be extended, mutatis mutandis, to their equivalents in the hadith, namely the \textit{ahādīth al-ḥākīm}. These are also \textit{ahādīth} which lay down practical rulings, commands, and prohibitions that demand performance and constitute the actionable laws (\textit{ḥākīm ʿamaliyyah}) of the Sunnah. A great deal of the legal hadith support and supplement the legal verses of the Qur’an by way either of elaboration, specification, or qualification of the Qur’anic injunctions of concern to human conduct. These may include worship matters (\textit{ʿibādāt}) and civil transactions (\textit{muʿāmalāt}), but they also introduce, albeit on a
limited scale, new rulings of the Shari‘ah on which the Qur’an may be silent.¹⁹

Aḥādīth al-ahkām are larger in number compared to the āyāt al-ahkām. According to an estimate attributed to Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī the legal hadith number at about 1,200 according to the traditional ṣīḥ methodology of selection. Determining the precise number, whether of the rule-based verses or aḥādīth, would much depend on the methodology and purpose of the selection.²⁰ Unlike the Qur’an which does not pose any question over the authenticity of its text, the hadith does, and so does the selection of aḥādīth al-ahkām from the large bulk of hadith: if one proposes a maqāṣidī approach to the selection of aḥādīth al-ahkām, one would need to verify the authenticity of the hadith in the first place. Yet the issue over authenticity of the aḥādīth al-ahkām may not be as challenging as that of the bulk of the hadith itself. This is because the aḥādīth al-ahkām are generally verified and adopted into the body of fiqh and the applied laws of the Shari‘ah, often endorsed by general consensus and continuous practice.

Since the thematic tafsīr (tafsīr mawḍū‘ī) has already gained general acceptance in the genres of Qur’an hermeneutics, one may propose the same approach to āyāt al-ahkām: Thematic unity in the larger body of hadith and chapterisation of its existing collections has to some extent been attempted, just as the so-called Sunan category of hadith purports on the whole to compile only the legal hadith. The effort to ascertain thematic unity in hadith is, moreover, likely to strike a note with that of the āyāt al-ahkām – since much of the legal hadith reiterate or supplement the āyāt al-ahkām. Thus it is likely that only a smaller number of hadith, in the ahkām category at least, would be left for an independent attempt at classification on the basis of theme and purpose. If one were to assimilate the general purpose, spirit and rationale of the hadith consistently with the Qur’an, the criteria of selection of hadith into the ahkām category should roughly be the same as one would propose with regard to the āyāt al-ahkām.

Furthermore, the circumstantial element in hadith is larger compared to the Qur’an as a great deal of hadith are known to have
addressed particular situations that may or may not amount to laying down a general law or hukm of the Shari‘ah. It is therefore important that in reading the hadith, one is aware of its original occasion and context, and avoid, as Ibn Ashur has warned, the temptation of engaging in literalism. “For holding on to the literalist understanding of Sunnah may miss out on implementing the spirit and purpose thereof, and worse still, if one unwittingly moves in the opposite direction, even through apparent adherence to its text.”

Ibn Ashur concurred that a great deal of the Sunnah is concerned with particular cases and situations and cannot be readily considered as a basis for universal legislation. This may well entail frequent recourse to qualification (taqyīd), generalisation (ta‘mīm) and particularisation (takhṣīṣ) of the rulings of the Sunnah. This was partly the reason why the Prophet discouraged his Companions from writing down his hadith. It is advisable therefore to read the detailed rulings of hadith in light of the general purposes and objectives of the Shari‘ah. The Companions understood the Sunnah in this way and the insight they had gained through direct involvement in its teachings – even by allowing themselves the liberality occasionally to move away from the text of a hadith in favour of its purpose. This is illustrated as follows:

a) The Prophet distributed, in line with a qur’anic injunction (8:41), the conquered lands of Khaybar among the Muslim soldiers, but later the caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb resisted the pressing demands of his fellow Companions when he refused to do the same with the fertile lands of Iraq. ʿUmar ordered instead that the conquered lands should remain with their owners who should pay the kharāj tax. This he did on the analysis that if he distributed the fertile land, the Companions would become settled landowners away from Madinah, and may well neglect jihad. Thus he went against the apparent ruling of the Sunnah and moved in the opposite direction, knowing that this would be in line with the purpose the Prophet himself would have embraced due to the change of circumstances.
b) The same tendency could be seen in the ruling of hadith on price control (tas\textsuperscript{a}r). The Prophet himself turned down a request from his Companions for price control at a time of price hikes in the market of Madinah and said that fixing commodity prices may prove unfair to commodity suppliers.\textsuperscript{24} But the opposite of this was ruled by the Successors (t\textsuperscript{a}bi\textsuperscript{u}n), including the so-called ‘Seven Jurists of Madinah,’ who held that the objective of ensuring fair market prices in their time actually favoured price control of essential foodstuffs. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), who spoke in support of this latter ruling, commented that the purpose was to ensure fair prices; the original ruling addressed that purpose during the Prophet’s time, but that the same purpose could best be achieved by introduction of carefully measured controls on the price of essentials, due to the change of market conditions.\textsuperscript{25}

c) According to a renowned hadith, “a Muslim does not inherit from an infidel (k\textsuperscript{a}fir), nor an infidel from a Muslim.”\textsuperscript{26} By general consensus (ijm\textsuperscript{a}), it is held that a non-Muslim does not inherit from a Muslim, and the majority have also held that a Muslim does not inherit from a non-Muslim either. However, many prominent figures among the Companions and Successors, including Mu\textsuperscript{a}dh ibn Jabal, Mu\textsuperscript{a}wiyyah ibn Abi Sufy\textsuperscript{n}, Mu\textsuperscript{a}hammad ibn al-\textsuperscript{H}anafiyyah and Sa\textsuperscript{a}d ibn al-Musayyib have held, as Ibn Taymiyyah recounts, that a Muslim may inherit from his non-Muslim relative, as the Prophet himself had allowed this in some cases. To this it is added that k\textsuperscript{a}fir in the above hadith refers to k\textsuperscript{a}fir harb\textsuperscript{i}, one who is engaged in active hostility with Muslims. It is also established on the authority of leading Companions, ʿAl\textsuperscript{i} ibn Abi Ṭ\textsuperscript{a}lib and ʿAbd All\textsuperscript{a}h ibn Mas\textsuperscript{a}d, that an apostate is inherited from by his Muslim relatives and that their case is not subsumed by the text of the above hadith. It is further added that k\textsuperscript{a}fir harb\textsuperscript{i} in this case also precludes protected non-Muslims (i.e. the dhimm\textsuperscript{\textregistered}s) as well as apostates and hypocrites (mun\textsuperscript{a}fiq\textsuperscript{\textregistered}n).\textsuperscript{27} Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim understood this hadith in the light of a
maqāṣid-based analysis that allowing Muslims to inherit from their non-Muslim relatives would encourage non-Muslims to embrace Islam and would not be deterred by the prospect of their preclusion from the estate of their non-Muslim relatives. When it is known that conversion to Islam does not mean loss of inheritance from one’s non-Muslim family, it works as an incentive, which is a suitable ground for specification (takhṣīṣ) of the general terms of the above hadith.²⁸

d) A woman who experiences menstruation during the hajj is allowed to continue, according to the instructions of a hadith, with the rest of the hajj rituals except for circumambulation (tawāf) around the Ka‘bah.²⁹ Ibn Taymiyyah’s analysis of this ruling of hadith led him to the conclusion that if the impediment of menstruation were to disqualify the woman from completing her hajj and required her to return from a long distance the same year or the next, it would mean hardship, which is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Shari‘ah. He added that in the Prophet’s lifetime it was not too difficult for the women of Madinah to tolerate the inconvenience, but that with the expansion of the territorial domains of Islam, and issues over the physical safety of women travelling alone, plus the additional expense, it would be in line with the goal and purpose of the Shari‘ah for her to complete the hajj and the tawāf. Ibn Taymiyyah added on a general note that ritual purity is not a prerequisite of tawāf, and also that a Shari‘ah obligation may be suspended on grounds of intolerable hardship, which is the issue here. However, if the woman concerned can stay in Makkah until the end of her menstruation without much hardship, she must do that, otherwise she is advised to take a bath and do the tawāf.³⁰

These examples serve to show that a specific requirement of the Sunnah is either relaxed or given an alternative interpretation, or even reversed to its opposite, in order to realise a higher purpose and goal of the Shari‘ah. One can add to these many more examples
from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Ibn Taymiyyah who looked into such issues concluded that the textual commands and prohibitions of the Shari'ah do not overrule their maṣlahah and maqāṣid-based understanding and import. For God the Most High revealed the Qur’an and sent the Messenger in order to realise ease and repel hardship, corruption and prejudice. One should in principle adhere to the clear injunctions of the Shari'ah at all times, and as far as possible, even if one does not perceive the benefit or harm in them. However, in the event where the harm of a command or prohibition overwhelms its benefit, effort must be made to minimise the harm even if a command of a lower order is abandoned or a less harmful prohibition is committed.31

MAQĀṢID AND CIVILISATION

The maqāṣid contemplate a welfare-oriented vision of Islamic civilisation for the whole of humanity through their obvious prioritisation of human welfare interests as are featured in the list of essential maqāṣid, the ḍaruriyyāt. Attention is also drawn in the scriptural sources of Islam to greening the earth and development of its resources. This is an integral part of the role of the Ummah and its vicegerency (istihlāf) on the earth. Establishing a just social order, promotion of the human intellect through education and scientific advancement, promotion of a strong family unit, creation of wealth and its legitimate acquisition and transfer are integral to humanity’s mission of vicegerency and advancement of a humane civilisation (ʿumrān). Wealth must, however, be prudently managed to enable its owners to “spend on others out of that which He (God) has made you trustees of” (5:7), and “give them (the have-nots) their share of the wealth God has bestowed upon you” (24:33). Earning through lawful work is the principal means of acquisition of wealth in the Shari‘ah. All able-bodied individuals are thus obligated to earn their living and avoid becoming a burden on others. “So tell them,” the Qur’an commands the Prophet, “to go and work, so that God may see the fruits of your labour, as will His Messenger and the believers” (9:105). The earth is made subservient to
mankind’s benefit, and mankind is then asked to “go and travel in its tracts and regions, and partake of the sustenance God has provided” (67:15). Honest work done with the intention to fulfil one’s responsibility towards one’s family and society is equated with an act of worship that earns God’s pleasure: “I shall not let go to waste (without due reward) the work of a worker among you, man or woman […]” (3:109).

On the prudent management of wealth, Muslims are directed to “let not those who are weak of judgment waste away the wealth God has made a means of sustenance for you” (4:5). Cooperation in good works among peoples and nations is a qur’anic purpose, indeed a universal maqṣid and responsibility of individuals and communities in Islam (49:13; 5:2). People differ, as the Qur’an affirms, in their natural talents and capabilities, and some are therefore in need of what others may have. Cooperation for reciprocal benefit thus becomes a necessity and a building block of the Qur’anic vision of a human civilisation on the earth. That vision also contemplates an appropriate level of distribution of wealth and opportunities among people that derives from beneficial work and cooperation among them. Building the earth through cooperation for people’s benefit thus becomes a universal maqṣid of Islam, which is premised on the general equality of all of its participants. General equality is the purport of the following hadith: “O People! Your Creator is one and you are all descendants of the same ancestor. There is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab nor of a black over the red except on the basis of righteous conduct.”

**CLASSIFICATION OF MAQĀŠID**

Maqāṣid have been classified in several ways depending on the viewpoint and purpose of the classification. Classifications are not always without a margin of uncertainty and overlap, yet they are a tool to facilitate better understanding. An overview of the classification of maqāṣid into the following five types will help advancing a better understanding of the subject:
From the viewpoint of their relative merit and importance, the maqāṣid have been classified into the three categories of essential purposes (daʿwiriyāt), complementary maqāṣid (ḥājiyāt) and desirabilities (taḥṣiniyyāt). Only the first of these have been specified into the five headings of the protection of life, religion, intellect, family and property. This is a well-known classification which is adequately treated in the existing works that need not be elaborated here. The uṣūl al-fiqh texts usually treat the maṣlahah in fuller detail but pay scant attention to the maqāṣid. They also tend to use maqāṣid and maṣāliḥ interchangeably, which is not altogether devoid of ambiguity and confusion. I shall therefore attempt to identify certain lines of distinction between these two closely associated subjects before I continue with the other classifications of maqāṣid.

Briefly, the maqāṣid command a degree of objectivity and permanence that may or may not obtain in the maṣāliḥ. Sometimes the maqāṣid are used as criteria to verify the authenticity and merit of maṣlahah. This is reflective in fact of the position taken by al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) who express reservations over the validity of maṣlahah as a source of law and judgement but validate it if it secures the maqāṣid of Shariʿah. Some writers have held the view that maṣlahah is the cause that leads to the maqāṣid of the Lawgiver, whereas others have described it as a utilitarian concept that looks mainly toward material benefits and may or may not qualify as the maqāṣid of the Lawgiver. For the maqāṣid are likely to have a broader outlook that often rises above utilitarian concerns. And then the maṣāliḥ also tend to be circumstantial and liable to change according to time and place. Al-Shaṭibī has thus described the maṣlahah to be relative and circumstantial (nisbī, iḍāfī) for the most part. To enact a law may be beneficial at one time and not so at another, and even at one and the same time it may be beneficial under some conditions but not so under different ones. The maqāṣid have, on the other hand, a quality of constancy and permanence that may be lacking in maṣlahah. Hence the maqāṣid provide criteria of validity for maṣlahah and stand a
degree above it. And lastly the *maqāsid* have a stronger textual grounding in the Qur’an and Sunnah. This is not the case with at least one, perhaps the most extensive, variety of *maṣlahah*, namely the unrestricted *maṣlahah* (i.e. *maṣlahah mursalah*), although the accredited *maṣlahah* (*maṣlahah muʿtabarah*) is also textually-founded.\(^{34}\)

2. From the viewpoint of their scope, the *maqāsid* have been classified into general purposes (*al-maqāsid al-ʿāmmah*) and particular goals (*al-maqāsid al-khāṣṣah*), to which we may add a third, namely partial purposes (*al-maqāsid al-juzʿīyyah*).\(^{35}\)

The general purposes are those that extend to the whole of Shariʿah in all its parts and they are on the whole broad and comprehensive. Realisation of benefit (*maṣlahah*), prevention of harm and corruption (*darar, mafsadah*), building the earth (*iʿmār al-ard*), administration of justice, and removal of hardship (*rafʿ al-ḥaraj*) are examples of the general purposes of Shariʿah. They differ from particular purposes in that the latter contemplate specific areas and subjects of the Shariʿah, such as commercial transactions (*muʿāmalāt*), crimes and punishments (*ʿuqūbāt*), matrimonial law (*munakāḥāt*), worship matters (*ʿibādāt*), acts of charity (*tabarīr*) and so forth. The two are not totally separate in that the specific *maqāsid* should observe and comply with the broader objectives of Shariʿah and should not go against them.\(^{36}\)

Partial purposes (*al-maqāsid al-juzʿīyyah*) may be defined as that which the Lawgiver has intended through each particular ruling of Shariʿah in any area or topic. This is similar to what is known as the effective cause (ʿillah) of a ruling, also referred to as *ḥikmah* (wise purpose), which the jurist needs to identify in the construction, for example, of analogy (*qiyyās*).\(^{37}\) One of the reasons why the *usūl* al-fiqh jurists have not expatiated on the *maqāsid* al-sharīʿah is that in their view ʿillah is about the same as the *maqāsid* of a ruling. Yet the present author has elsewhere argued that this could also mean an attempt to subsume the *maqāsid* under the *usūl* methodology and thus deny them independent recognition.\(^{38}\) The ʿillah of a ruling may or may not be
the same as its purpose. For one thing, ‘illah of a ruling tends to be more grounded in the status quo and existing order of values, whereas its end-goal and purpose may be looking more to the future. Without wishing to engage into details, if one were to apply all the conditions of the ‘illah to the maqṣid, the whole idea of a maqṣid is likely to be subjected to unwarranted restrictions.

3. The maqāṣid have also been classified into the purposes of the Lawgiver (maqāṣid al-shārī‘ah) and human purposes (maqāṣid al-mukallaf). To say that human welfare and benefit are God’s illustrious purpose behind the laws of Shari‘ah, or pursuit of religious knowledge with the intention of seeking closeness to God, illustrates the former, whereas seeking employment or university qualifications may represent the human purpose of seeking knowledge. It is generally recommended that all competent persons should bring, as far as possible, their own purposes into conformity with the maqāṣid of the Lawgiver.39

4. It is also useful to know that some of the maqāṣid are primary (al-maqāṣid al-ašliyyah) which the Lawgiver, or a human agent, have originally intended, whereas others are subsidiary (al-maqāṣid al-tabā‘iyyah) which support and complement the primary maqāṣid. Acquisition and transfer of ownership, for instance, represent the primary Shari‘ah purposes of a sale contract, whereas wanting to build a house or a garden in a plot of land the buyer has purchased may be said to be a secondary purpose. Similarly the primary Shari‘ah purpose of marriage is procreation of the human species, which may or may not materialise in a marriage among elderly persons contracted with the purpose mainly of companionship – which is a secondary purpose.40

5. Lastly, the maqāṣid may be either definitive (qaṭ‘i) or speculative (zannī). The former signify purposes which are based in a clear text of the Qur‘an, hadith, or general consensus (ijma‘), whereas the latter may be based on a speculative text, rationality and ijtihād.41 The definitive purposes of Shari‘ah command higher
authority than speculative purposes; in the event of a conflict between them, the former prevail over the latter.

IDENTIFICATION OF MAQĀŠID

This section begins with a brief differentiation of maqāsid and mašāliḥ, followed by a reference to the underdeveloped state of the maqāsid. A more detailed discussion is then attempted to expound the methodology by which the maqāsid are ascertained and identified: through the clear text, the human intellect (‘aql – also unrestricted reasoning – istidlāl), inductive reasoning (istiqrā’), and innate human nature (fitrāli).

Maqāsid are often equated with mašāliḥ (interests, benefits) and the two are used interchangeably. They do admittedly resemble in many ways but also differ in others. Maqāsid are goals that suggest a degree of finality and permanence. Al-Shāṭibī thus characterised them as “the fundamentals of religion, basic rules of the revealed law, and universals of belief.”42 Ibn Ashur similarly described the maqāsid as either “certain, or uncertain close to certainty – qat‘i aw zanī qarīb min al- qat‘i.”43 Mašāliḥ are, on the other hand, largely circumstantial and liable to change. Hence the maqāsid tend to be a rank above the mašāliḥ and in many ways constitute criteria of validity for them.44 Maqāsid and mašāliḥ can be coterminous and convergent but they could also relate to one another in their capacities as means and ends: The maqāsid signify higher goals and ends whereas mašāliḥ could either be the same as maqāsid or may serve as means toward attaining them.

As noted earlier, the legal theory of ṣuṣūl al-fiqh marginalised the maqāsid, which is why the methodology for their identification has also remained underdeveloped. The clear text (of Qur’an and Hadith) is the principal carrier of maqāsid by general consensus. Even though protection of the mind (‘aql) is included in the essential maqāsid (darūriyyāt), Muslim scholars are not in agreement as to whether ‘aql can validate a maqāsid without the authority of a scriptural proof, or naql. Can rationality alone identify and validate a maqāsid and purpose of the Shari‘ah, and what are the principal indicators and identifiers of maqāsid?
Maqāsid al-Shari‘ah, Ijtihad and Civilisational Renewal

1. **Clear text:** The strongest evidence that can establish the validity of a *maqāsid* is a definitive text of the Qur’an or Hadith. Failing which, recourse may be had to what al-Shāfi‘i and al-Juwaynī have termed as sound reasoning (*istidlāl*), which ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Salām has termed variously as reason (*al-ʿaql*), experience (*al-tajribah*) and innate perception (*al-fi‘rah*). These are roughly equivalent terms to that of al-Shāṭibī’s inductive reasoning (*al-istiqrā‘*).

   Each of the foregoing methods can be used as indicators of *maqāsid*, be it independently from one another or in combination, provided that the following requirements are met:

   (a) In the event where a clear text validates a *maqāsid*, and there is no other text that introduces an element of uncertainty and doubt therein.

   (b) The *maqāsid* in question is clear of conflict with another *maqāsid* of equal standing.

   (c) The *maqāsid* concerned fulfils all four conditions: certainty over its existence (*thubūt*), clarity (*zuhūr* – it can be seen for what it is), constancy (*inḍībāt* – obtains in all situations), and exclusiveness (*iṭṭirād* – precludes confusion with its similitudes). Plurality of methods by which a *maqāsid* is identified and known adds to credibility, while the use, in the meantime, of a single method does not diminish the value of the result arrived at.45 In the event of a conflict arising between the evidential bases of two *maqāsids*, recourse may be had to the rules of interpretation pertaining to conflict and preference (*al-ta‘āruḍ wa al-tarfiḥ*).

2. **Inductive reasoning (*istiqrā‘*):** Al-Shāṭibī proposed *istiqrā‘* as a reliable identifier of *maqāsid* next to the clear text. A *maqāsid* or goal of Shari‘ah may be identified by a clear text, failing which recourse may be had to a general reading of the text: There may be various textual references to a subject, all of which may be in the nature of allusions rather than decisive declarations. Yet
when read together their collective meaning and weight leaves little doubt as to the purpose on which they concur. A decisive conclusion may, in other words, be drawn from a plurality of speculative expressions. Al-Shaţibî illustrates this by saying that nowhere in the Qur’an is there a specific declaration to say that the Shari‘ah has been enacted for the benefit of mankind. Yet this is a definitive conclusion drawn from a general reading of the Qur’an.46

Similarly, the Qur’an has nowhere enumerated the five essential maqāṣid in a clear text, but they are so identified by way of induction and general reading thereof. The inductive method also provides insight into the source evidence on maqāṣid that can reduce the prospects of error. At times people take strong positions based on weak evidence, such as in the case of child marriage, and guardianship of adult women, claiming them to be Shari‘ah requirements, even in the absence of clear evidence. One should in such cases look for evidence in the clear text, failing which one resorts to a general reading of the text and ascertains its purpose. For instance, if human dignity (karāmah), equality (musāwâh), justice (‘adl), and fair treatment (ihsân) are the overriding objectives of the Shari‘ah, then the question arises as to how they are reflected in the contested positions at issue.

The issue here may be over the proper uses of guardianship (qiwāmah and wilāyah) in contemporary contexts, and evidence shows that abuse of guardianship powers in respect of women of almost all ages has become so extensive as to warrant a fresh enquiry into the sources. In a quest to limit the scope of guardianship only to its valid applications, one may need to attempt a fresh interpretation of the source evidence in the light of the maqāṣid. Abuse of guardianship is marked by its manifest neglect of the human dignity of the ward, and denial of justice and fair treatment to them. This maqāṣid-based enquiry and ijtihād is warranted simply because many of the abusive applications of guardianship violate the higher goals and purposes of the Shari‘ah.
3. Human intellect (‘aql): Can we accept human intellect and judgment as validator of maqāṣid side-by-side with the text—or even in the absence of any clear text? Different responses have been given by both the earlier and modern jurists. Few would seem to agree that ‘aql alone can validate the maqāṣid without any textual evidence. Most have agreed, however, that reason can evaluate human conduct of concern to temporal affairs, but that reason cannot provide a reliable basis of evaluation on devotional matters (‘ibādāt).

The discourse on this point tends to run parallel, for the most part, with the one that has arisen concerning the proof of maṣlaḥah/maqṣid. Al-Ghazālī went on record to say “It is by means of ‘aql that people know the benefits of this world.”

Credibility is given, however, al-Ghazālī added, to the intellect of those with sound judgment and knowledge of the custom and culture of society. ʻIzz al-Dīn ʻAbd al-Salām observed that “temporal benefits and harms are mostly known and identified by ‘aql, not only in the Shari‘ah of Islam, but in most other legal traditions. A person of sound judgment would know, even before the existence of a revealed text, that realisation of pure benefit or prevention of pure evil is praiseworthy. The learned in most legal traditions, and all the revealed laws, tend to be in agreement on the prohibition of murder, theft, adultery and the like [...]. As for the benefit/harm of concern to the hereafter, these can only be known by means of transmitted proof (naql).”

Ibn Taymiyyah’s view on the authority of ‘aql is similar but adds a reference to innate human nature (al-fiṭrah) that also plays a role in the identification of maqāṣid, as elaborated below.

Al-Juwaynī discussed the place of sound reasoning (istidlāl) in the categories of recognised proofs. The proponents of istidlāl were mainly from the Malikī, but also many from the Ḥanafī and Shāfī‘ī schools, all of whom accepted istiṣlāh (consideration of public interest) as a valid basis of law and judgment in the Shari‘ah. The Shāfī‘ī school holds istidlāl to be a valid basis of judgment even if it cannot be traced to a clear text, provided that it operates close to the meaning and spirit of the established ‘roots.’

Imām al-Shāfī‘ī referred to the precedent of the
Companions saying that leading figures among them exercised flexibility; whenever they could not find a textual ruling on a matter they would resort to sound reasoning—*istidlāl*. Human intellect (*al-‛aql*) is informed by the senses, but has the capacity to go beyond the data of the senses, although it falls short of the wider reaches of revelation (*al-wahy*). The intellect performs a number of functions. It perceives that which is unseen based on that which is seen, derives universals from concrete particulars, recognises self-evident truth, and associates causes and effects. It is a criterion of responsibility, and the criterion by which God has honoured human beings above the rest of His creation. It is also the only means by which human beings can know the Shari‘ah and the essence of responsibility and *taklīf*. Human reason is therefore a credible basis of judgment in the absence of revelation, provided that the judgment arrived at is in harmony with the general spirit and guidance of the revealed scripture.

There may be subtle differences between *‛aql* and wisdom (*ḥikmah*), yet *‛aql* should aim at inclusivity and merger with *ḥikmah*. This may to some extent be a question of the input *‛aql* can have from culture that can generate wisdom through the light of experience. The lessons drawn from past errors should inform one’s perspective on formal logic, *istidlāl* and syllogism that may or may not be endowed in cultural wisdom and the insight gained from experience.

4. *Human nature (al-‛ifrah)*: A tendency inheres in the human make up to accept good and reject evil. *‛Ifrah* is a Qur’anic term denoting a human disposition that inheres in every person and thus universal by the fact of its commonality. The Qur’anic assignment of the vicegerency (*istikhlāf*—Qur’an 2:30) of man makes everyone a carrier of a Divine trust and mission to build the earth. *‛Ifrah* thus refers to the innate nature of God’s trusted vicegerents, all of whom partake in a sparkle of the Divine (Qur’an 38:72), and excel in ranks the rest of His creatures (Qur’an 17:70). This is also manifested in Islam’s designation of itself as *dīn al-‛ifrah*, a religion that strikes harmony with enlightened human nature.
In his *Kitāb al-Najāt*, Ibn Sinā (d. 1037) tends to equate *fitrah* with intellect (*'aqīl*) in a passage where he speaks of intuitive intellect (*fitrah*) endowed in someone who is brought into this world without prior exposure to society, its realities and customs. Then he perceives and comprehends concrete realities and cases. Something is then presented to him of which he becomes doubtful, if doubt is possible for him; his innate understanding will not affirm it. If on the other hand, doubt is not possible, his innate understanding must of necessity affirm it. Ibn Sinā admits, however, that not everything affirmed by *fitrah* is true; what is true is the capacity of innate human reason to discern values, good and bad, in what is perceived by the senses.53

Ibn Ashur linked the *maqāsid* to *al-fitrah*, quoting a qur’anic text, and concluded that both the Shari‘ah and its *maqāsid* bear harmony with *al-fitrah*:54

And so, set thy face steadfast towards the one true faith, turning away from all that is false, in accordance with the natural disposition (*fitrah*) which God has endowed in humankind. Allow no change to alter (or corrupt) what God has endowed. (Qur’an 30:30)

Natural reason is thus an inherent endowment, and Islam bears essential harmony with it. It is evident nevertheless that God has not left human affairs to be judged by reason alone.

For Ibn Ashur, *fitrah* also refers to the natural disposition (*khilqah*) and the natural order (*niżām*) that God endowed in every creature. The human *fitrah* consists both of inward and outward manifestations. Walking on two feet is just as much an aspect of man’s physical *fitrah* as is his intellect and reason. Similarly relating effects to their causes and drawing conclusions from them is an intellectual *fitrah*. He argued that the Shari‘ah injunctions aim at harmony with human nature but also seek to liberate and enlighten it against superstition and corrupting influences. For example, survival of the species, cooperation for the common good, protection of life and lineage all correspond to natural human proclivities. Similarly, building the earth and
a virtuous civilisation therein, pursuit of knowledge and intellectual creativity correspond with the human fitrah. Islam does not aim to suppress nor eradicate these nor the innate human nature.

Ibn Ashur refers to the laws of Hammurabi, of ancient Egypt, Moses, Zoroaster, as well as ancient India etc., but adds that none had the characteristics of universality that would transcend their geographic and socio-cultural confines in which they appeared. Islam on the other hand emerged in an era and setting that had preserved its simplicity in isolation from major civilisational spheres of the ancient world. Islam emerged in an Arabian setting but never confined its outlook to that context, and as the Qur’an proclaimed, brought a universal message for human guidance. Islam recognised the diversity of peoples and cultures, their laws and languages (Qur’an 5:48; 30:22; 2:136) and encouraged recognition and friendship among them (49:13). The Muslim community is described as the mid-most community (ummatan wasaṭan), committed to moderation and justice (2:143). “The essence of all virtues (fadā’il) and sound fitrah lies in moderation in all matters.” Ibn Ashur’s commentator, El-Messawi, observed that through Ibn Ashur’s understanding of fitrah, one can see how he conceived the universality of Islam and “the proposition that the shari‘ah objectives (maqāṣid) are grounded in man’s fitrah […] [signifying] a cardinal attribute of the shari‘ah.”

The study of fitrah should enable one to identify what it is one must protect, how Islam protects it, what happens when one loses it, and how does one restore the natural balance once disturbed. We must examine various standards of “modern progress” that may be out of line with the healthy development of human fitrah, as I illustrate below.

(a) Some have urged the use of pre-school facilities for children at an early age of three so as to help them become quickly intelligent. Entering school at age three may be good socialisation, but it is premature, and may even
deprive children of their childhood. The *fitrah* of small children is that they learn by playing, not by studying. Excessive after-school tutoring also tends to rob children of their natural inclinations; they then grow up deprived and emotionally imbalanced.

(b) The incessant drive for technological progress has taken industrial powers to over-utilisation of natural resources. The urge to gain a technological edge over a rival industry or country often results in disgraceful sacrifice of human lives and values. The arms manufacturers of the world stand out for their total disregard of natural human rights and values. Environmental degradation and the ever-increasing incidents of natural disasters are proof of these excesses and those of the oil-producing countries and companies in their aggressive drive for commercial gain. The natural balance demanded by *fitrah* has been disturbed, and in some cases to the point of irreversibility.

(c) Mainstream media and advertisements have turned women into sex symbols that denigrate their human dignity. One can advertise an elegant car, for instance, for what it is without the addition of a half naked girl to the picture. Yet the imbalances of greed and abusive advertising exceed natural *fitrah*, and worse still, puts a car above the price of human dignity.

(d) Similar tendencies of upsetting the natural balance of values could be seen in the overtures of feminist movements. In their quest for freedom, the children’s needs for their mothers’ time and attention, and priorities of motherhood are sometimes neglected, and society bears the costs. Children grow up emotionally imbalanced. They play in motorcycle gangs, dancing in nightclubs, taking drugs and so on.
SCOPE OF MAQĀSID: USūL AL-FIQH AND BEYOND

Our attempt to open the scope and theory of the maqāsid suggests the use of maqāsid as criteria, in a broad sense, for evaluation of all rulings and decisions of concern to the Shari‘ah – especially those of fatwa and ijtihad in conjunction with new issues. Traditional Islamic scholarship accorded this status to uṣūl al-fiqh which is used as criteria of the validity for juridical decision-making and research. We now propose to assign this role to the maqāsid while in the meantime using the resources of uṣūl al-fiqh that often endorse and enrich the scope of legal reasoning and ijtihad. The purpose is to strike a balance between the rules of the Shari‘ah and its higher goals and purposes while ensuring in the meantime that our formulas and methods do not engage in burdensome technicalities. Methodological accuracy is undoubtedly important, yet it should not be allowed to distance the researcher from the goals and purposes of the Shari‘ah – something that the uṣūl al-fiqh methodology has been unable to avoid. Human welfare should remain as the mega-purpose of the Shari‘ah. To quote al-Shāţibī:

Since it is established that the rules of the shari‘ah aim to serve human interest, it follows that human actions should be judged on its basis […]. When an act is legitimate in both essence and appearance, no difficulty arises. However, if an act is consistent [with the law] in appearance yet contrary to human interest, it is invalid, and anyone who acts contrary to human welfare is engaged in an illegitimate exercise.\(^5\)

Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) did not specifically write on maqāsid. However, the conclusion of his important book, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, identified achievement of moral and spiritual virtues such as gratitude, purity, justice and generosity as the ultimate objectives of all law. He similarly noted in his Faṣl al-Maqāl that the ultimate purpose of the law is simply to advocate the truth and encourage acting upon it. In an interesting essay on Ibn Rushd, al-Raysuni observed that Ibn Rushd called attention through these statements to the cardinal purposes of the Shari‘ah (al-maqāsid al-‘ulūyā li al-shari‘ah), the moral and spiritual aspects of conduct that are
emphasised in the Qur’an and accentuate the merits of faith, purity and wisdom (cf. Qur’an 62:2). The key Ḥanbali scholar, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, also emphasised the primacy of ethical norms to the whole structure of Islamic values:

The *shari‘ah* is founded in wisdom and realisation of people’s welfare in this life and the next. It is all about justice, mercy, and the common good. Thus any ruling that replaces justice with injustice, mercy with its opposite, common good with mischief, and wisdom with indiscretion does not belong to the *shari‘ah*, even if it is claimed to be so according to some interpretations.

Ibn Ashur identified the greatest purpose (*al-maqāsid al-a‘zam*) of the Shari‘ah as “achievement of well-being and integrity and prevention of harm and corruption.” He further identified it as the general objective (*al-maqāsid al-‘ām*) of the Shari‘ah to “preserve normal order among the Ummah and perpetuate its well-being and integrity through the well-being and integrity of […] the whole of the human race.” On the universality of the *maqāsid*, Ibn Ashur further observed:

The *shari‘ah* aims at preservation of the world order and regulation of the people’s conduct in a way that protects against corruption and collapse. This can only be realised through the promotion of benefit and prevention of harm in all their manifestations.

Ibn Ashur is clearly not too concerned with the juristic aspects of *maqāsid*; “he is rather trying to capture its civilisational dimension, cultural and political significance as a foundational framework of his thought.” Ibn Ashur’s contemporary, Allal al-Fasi, also identified as a cardinal purpose of the Shari‘ah:

To develop and populate the earth and maintain peace and order among people. The well-being of the planet earth and its usefulness for human habitat can be assured through devotion to right conduct by all those who bear the Divine trust of vicegerency. It is also to ensure that people act justly toward one another and observe the standards of moral integrity;
that they reform all that which need to be reformed, tap the resources of the earth, and plan for the common good of all.\textsuperscript{64}

Al-Raysuni concluded that the centrality of human welfare to the \textit{maqāṣid} is a shared position of the majority of jurists across the \textit{madhāhib}, with the exception perhaps of the Zāhirīs, who differ with it not in principle, but in the degree to which they use it. The \textit{maqāṣid} are thus identified as criteria of evaluation of legal rulings obtained through ijtihad and interpretation. Al-Shāṭibī also emphasised paying attention to the particular side by side with the universal objectives of Islam – and \textit{vice versa}.\textsuperscript{65}

This integrated approach to \textit{maqāṣid}-based research and ijtihad is further extended to the treatment of means and ends so as to avoid disparity and divergence between them. Questions arose and responses given as to whether the means to a command (\textit{al-amr}), obligation (\textit{wājib}), and prohibition (\textit{ḥarām}) should also be seen as integral to the ends that they serve. In response it is said that the supplementary aspects of commands and prohibitions are indeed integral to their ends and purposes. Thus according to a legal maxim of Shari‘ah “what is indispensable for the accomplishment of a \textit{wājib} becomes a part of that \textit{wājib}, and the means to \textit{ḥarām} also becomes \textit{ḥarām}.”\textsuperscript{66}

Another benefit of the wider use of the \textit{maqāṣid} proposed here is to minimise the scope of disagreement in ijtihad and the differential conclusions that Muslim schools and scholars have often derived through ijtihad, \textit{istidlāl} (open reasoning) and other \textit{uṣūl al-fiqh} doctrines. One could expect wider levels of agreement if the \textit{uṣūl} doctrines are read, not as independent tools and formulas, but in the light of their higher goals and purposes. It is not unusual, for example, to see differences in the application of analogy (\textit{qiyyās}) by different jurists who derive differential results that stand in questionable relationship with their original objective and purpose. Had the leading \textit{madhāhib} agreed over the primacy of \textit{maqāṣid} and accorded them due prominence, greater uniformity in their rulings and interpretations could be expected.\textsuperscript{67}
According to a survey report on the Sunnite and Shiite applications of *maqāṣid*, it was found that their differences are minimal. Both tend to discuss “the same topics: *ijtihād*, *qiyyās*, *ḥuqūq*, *qiyyām*, *akhlāq* and so on, refer to the same jurists and books: al-Juwaynī’s *Burhān*, Ibn Bābawayh’s ‘*Ila il-Sharī‘ī*, al-Ghazālī’s *Mustaṣfā*, al-Shāṭibi’s *Muwāfaqāt*, and Ibn Ashur’s *Maqāṣid* – and use the same theoretical classifications – *maṣāliḥ*, *ḍarūrāt*, *ḥājiyāt*, *taḥsiniyyāt*, *maqāṣid āmmah*, *maqāṣid khāṣṣah* and so on.”

It is then added that most of the juridical differences between the Sunnite and Shiite schools are due to their differences over the *āḥād* (solitary) hadith and the different conclusions drawn from them.

“A *maqāṣidī* approach to jurisprudence,” as Jasser Auda commented, “is a holistic approach that does not restrict itself to [any] one narration or partial ruling, but rather refers to general principle and common ground. Implementing the higher purposes of unity and reconciliation of Muslims has a higher priority over implementing *fiqh* details.” The leading Lebanese Ayyatollah, the late Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Dīn proscribed hostile disagreement and aggression along the Shiite-Sunnite lines of division, “based on the higher and fundamental purposes of reconciliation, unity and justice.”

Without exaggeration, unity among the Ummah is one of the cardinal goals of Islam – even if the *maqāṣid* discourse of earlier times has not articulated it as such, it must be clearly identified now. Islam speaks of *tawḥīd*, the Oneness of the Creator, and by implication also of the oneness of humanity.

Islam provides numerous theological and juridical grounds for the unity of the Ummah. Yet much of the *usūl al-fiqh* literature was written during the height of Abbasid power when the Caliphate of Baghdad ruled over the Muslims under one leadership, hence the relative absence of a focus on Muslim unity at that time. The emphasis then was on the opposite of unity. In the era of *ijtihād* (first four centuries of Islam), Muslim scholars encouraged diversity in their attempt to propose many a new *madhhab*, doctrine and movement to enrich the scope of interpretation and *ijtihād*. Yet unwittingly perhaps, *ijtihād* was used as an instrument of disagreement (*ikhtilāf*) more than that of consensus (*ijma‘*). What seemed
desirable to our thought leaders of the past has become rather a difficult challenge for the Muslim Ummah of today. Colonialism and its aftermath undoubtedly left a legacy of divisiveness and seeds of many problems for the renewed unity of the Ummah. There is a greater need now for consensus than ikhtilaf; our ‘ulamā’ and leaders are therefore advised to nurture consensus and unity in their deliberations. This can be achieved even better by taking a purposive or maqāṣidī approach to legal enquiry and research.

THE SCOPE OF MAQĀṢID REVISITED

A valid concern exists as to where one draws the line in one’s attempt at expanding the scope of the maqāṣid, and how does one distinguish the valid from spurious additions. One observer noted that research in maqāṣid has advanced at a rapid pace giving rise to a methodological problem as to the viability of many of its findings. That the new additions made to the initial list of five essential maqāṣid by scholars like Ibn Ashur, Muhammad al-Ghazali, Gemal Atiyya, Abd al-Majid al-Najjar and many others “opened the door very wide to include other [new] maqāṣid that seem to increase unreservedly. The question is whether all these are genuine maqāṣid.”

It is then stated that al-Shaṭibi’s identification of the leading five maqāṣid, as well as his classification of maqāṣid/maṣāliḥ into the three classes of essential, complementary and desirable (darūrī, hājī, tahsīnī) was done through induction as there is no text either in the Qur’an or hadith to enumerate or classify them as such. Al-Shaṭibi’s conclusions were based on conceptual induction of the common meaning (istiqrā’ ma’nawī) of the numerous references to these (five maqāṣid) in the Qur’an and hadith. It is then recommended that maqāṣid should be identified by the same methodology that the ‘ulamā’ of uṣūl have used for the identification of ‘illah – thus mentioning ṣabr and taqṣīm (isolation and assignment), and also takhrīj al-manāṭ (extraction of ‘illah). To put it simply, maqāṣid are to be identified in accordance with the uṣūl methodology for identification of ‘illah, which would effectively place the maqāṣid back under the umbrella of the conventional uṣūl al-fiqh. The advice of
caution so given is valid. But recourse to the *uşūl* methodology would be tantamount to inviting the problematics of those hallowed methodologies, which actually impeded rather than encouraged originality and *ijtihad*. Besides, the *maqāsid* is not the same as *ʿillah*: whereas *ʿillah* looks basically to the existing status quo, a *maqāsid* goes beyond that, and one would not want to burden the *maqāsid* with the same technicalities as the *uşūl al-fiqh* applied to identification of *ʿillah*.

It is well to remember that al-Shāfiʿī himself tried to avoid the *uşūl* methodology of *ʿillah* as he viewed the *maqāsid* differently to *ʿillah*: his inductive reasoning involved a quest for broader meanings and common conceptual denominators. The scholar-*mujtahid* thus draws a general principle from his observation of a number of smaller incidents. Moreover, when someone of the standing of Ibn Ashur adds *fiṭrah*, or when al-Qaradawi adds justice and freedom, and al-Najjar protection of the environment to the range of *maqāsid* – they have presumably done so in light of their general knowledge and insight into the sources of Islam. They have not subsumed the *maqāsid* under the *uşūl* methodologies of *ʿillah*. The present writer is not advising that either. What is suggested here is to observe the textual guidelines of Islam but also to use induction (*iṣṭiqāʿ*), unrestricted reasoning (*istidlāl*), human intellect (*ʿaql*), and innate human nature (*fiṭrah*) as indicators and identifiers of *maqāsid*. It is advisable also to preserve the inherent versatility and dynamism of *maqāsid* in tandem with our quest for improvement, civilisational renewal and reform.

I now propose to review the scope of *maqāsid* from its designated list of five towards an open-ended scale of values. This is because *maqāsid* in the sense of goals and purposes of the Shariʿah can logically not be limited to a particular number, simply because the Shariʿah itself is not limited in that order. Our understanding of the Shariʿah is one of its continuing relevance, development and growth through independent reasoning (*ijtihad*), renewal and reform (*tajdīd, ʾiṣlāḥ*). Hence, the goals and purposes of the Shariʿah must also remain an evolving chapter of the juristic and civilisational edifice of Islam.
Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), who attempted to widen the scope of the maqāsid so long ago, observed that anyone who reads the Qur’an will find a variety of other values that also merit consideration well beyond the scope of the five essentials. Thus he added such other themes as fulfilment of contracts, trustworthiness (amānah), honouring one’s neighbours, sincerity, and moral rectitude, and maintained that maqāsid are open-ended and evolving. Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach has been supported by leading twentieth-century jurists, including Ibn Ashur, Muhammad al-Ghazali, al-Qaradawi, al-Raysuni, Attia, Muhammad Siraj, Khamlishi and many others.

Al-Qaradawi added to the five leading maqāsid such other values as justice, human dignity and human rights, especially the rights of the oppressed, freedom, and social welfare assistance, all of which find support in the Qur’an. Ghazali, Khamlishi, Attia and Siraj also made a strong case for the inclusion of equality and justice among the higher maqāsid. Siraj ranked equality only slightly below freedom and justice. The starting point is justice, which is however not possible without equality. I also propose world peace, economic development, science research, and fundamental constitutional rights to be added to the leading maqāsid.

Ibn Ashur further observed that the conventional maqāsid are on the whole premised on the well-being of individuals, thus leaving out well-being of the Muslim community as a maqāsid. Since the Ummah’s well-being and international standing depend on its economic and scientific success, these should also be included in the maqāsid. And then again, if the well-being of the Ummah necessitates its unity, this too should be included. Al-Qaradawi also wrote:

I believe there is a category of maqāsid which has not been duly recognised, namely those that concern the society at large. For if most of the maqāsid are related to the individual, such as preservation of the individual’s religion, life, faculty of reason, material wealth etc., then where do we stand with regard to such other goals as freedom, equality and justice, and how are they to be evaluated?
Muhammad al-Ghazali posed the question: Are we not entitled to benefit from the 14 centuries of Islamic history? Corrupt rule over the centuries led to baneful outcomes. Hence we could add freedom and justice to the five essentials. Justice is a cardinal objective of Islam based on the unequivocal authority of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Similarly, the affairs of community and state can hardly be regulated without the guarantee of freedom. Since the Qur’an advocates freedom, it too should be recognised as a goal and maqṣid of the Shari‘ah.  

Al-Raysuni observed that the existing list of essentials is based on ijtihad and so is the idea of raising their number beyond the initial five. There are other vital interests whose importance the religion has unequivocally affirmed, there remaining no reason why they too should not be added to the five recognised maqāṣid.

MEANS AND ACCOMPLISHERS

(WASĀ‘IL WA MUKAMMILAT) OF MAQĀṢID

This aspect of the maqāṣid methodology is not well-known, yet it is clearly important for a holistic understanding of maqāṣid. Maqāṣid and the means that secure them are inter-related so much so that the knowledge of the one without the other would leave open the possibility of errors in the understanding of Shari‘ah. This complementarity of means and purposes is underscored in Bin Bayyah’s broad observation that the Shari‘ah in its entirety consists of maqāṣid and wasā‘il. Whereas the latter are liable to change in tandem with various factors, the former tend to be more stable and less liable to oscillation. The maqāṣid are, moreover, desired in themselves, whereas the wasā‘il are means that beget the maqāṣid and may not as such be desired in themselves. Yet the means are often subsumed under their purposes, depending on the strength or weakness of their linkage: If the means in question be indispensable to securing their relevant maqāṣid, then according to the renowned legal maxim: “that without which a wājib (obligation command) cannot be accomplished also become a part of that wājib” and both would
be covered by the same rules. This maxim refers, however, to means that is instrumental and direct to a *maqṣid* but not to ones that may only be attached to a subsidiary or incidental aspect thereof.\(^{85}\) A possible misunderstanding can arise from confusing the means with the purpose, which can result either in the neglect of the *maqṣid*, or exaggeration in the importance of it means. Hence a correct placement of the one in relationship with the other calls for a degree of jurisprudential insight.\(^{86}\)

The accomplishers are, broadly speaking, an addition to the *maqāsid* and not a separate category thereof as they permeate the entire range of *maqāsid*, be it essential (*danūrī*), complimentary (*hājī*), or desirable (*taḥshīnī*) and so forth.

The means and accomplishers to a *maqṣid* may have been identified in the Qurʾan or hadith, failing which they may be identified by recourse to rationality and ijtihad. To illustrate the accomplisher of the essential, or *danūrī*, we note that the Qurʾan enjoins that a future obligation (*dayn*), or a mortgage (*al-rahn*) should be documented and reduced into writing (2:283). This is to ensure preservation of property (*ḥifẓ al-māl*), which is one of the essential goals. Documentation in this case is not a goal in itself, but a means toward the protection of an essential *maqṣid*. Then by way of analogy the same requirement is extended to all contracts and transactions, which should also be documented so as to protect them against possible disputation. Similarly, the text stipulates marriage as a means of realising the *maqṣid* of reproduction (*al-nasl, al-nasab*) but then the details that are attached to marriage, such as a valid contract, dower, maintenance, guardianship and the like are the accomplishers of marriage, some of which have also been specified by the text of the Qurʾan and hadith.

To illustrate the accomplisher of a complementary goal (*mukām-mil al-hājī*), we may refer to contractual options (*al-khayyārīt*, sing. *khayyār*) that can be inserted, on the authority of hadith, in a contract of sale. Upon concluding a sale, for instance, the purchaser may stipulate an option that he will ratify the deal in two or three days. The permisibility of sale is a complementary (*hājī*) interest or means in relationship to the protection of property (*ḥifẓ al-māl*) and
inserting an option into a sale contract ensures that it is validly concluded and free of fraud, misrepresentation and gharar. To illustrate the accomplisher of a taḥṣīnī, or a desirable goal, we may refer to all legitimate means that keep the market place clear of transactions over unclean, poisonous and harmful substances, or which ensure that the passage-ways in the market place are not overcrowded.87

It is a condition of the accomplisher, or mukammil, however, that it does not exceed nor overrule the initial goal and purpose which it seeks to accomplish. Food, for example, is a means for preservation of life; however, it is not acceptable for it to be transformed into a maqsid such that one lives to eat rather than eating to live. This example can be extended to making money, obtaining a house and means of transport etc., all of which are accomplishers and means. If people fail to associate them properly with their purposes, the danger would arise of them becoming end-goals in themselves.88

To take our previous example of sale and option again, the purpose of the option as a mukammil is to prevent uncertainty and ignorance (i.e., gharar) in the sale at issue, but if one were to exaggerate the mukammil and demand total exclusion of all ignorance and gharar, it would be difficult to achieve the purpose, and may even obstruct the sale altogether. For a slight amount of gharar is unavoidable and usually tolerated in many transactions, including sale.89

In the event there be numerous means for the realisation of a single purpose, the one that is most likely to secure the purpose in a complete, prompt and direct manner shall be selected. Should there be a situation, however, where several available means are equally good in order to realise the maqsid in question, then any one or more may be selected for the purpose. The Shariʿah thus provides certain guidelines with regard to the selection of means, this being an area, however, where greater flexibility and choice is granted over the selection of means. Hence the scholar/judge may make appropriate decisions over them in the light of surrounding circumstances.90
Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashur, the twentieth century author of the landmark work bearing the title, *Maqāsid al-Sharī‘ah al-Islāmiyyah*, has observed that knowledge of the *maqāsid* is indispensable to ijtihad in all of its manifestations. Some ‘ulamā’ who confined the scope of their ijtihad only to literal interpretations have found it possible, Ibn Ashur added, to project a personal opinion into the words of the text and fell into error as they were out of line with the general spirit and purpose of the surrounding evidence. This may be illustrated by reference to shortcomings that are detected in some rulings of the Ṣāḥīḥi school and those of the hadith scholars. One of the reasons for such errors is that reported speech reduced into writing often loses contextual connotations and features of both the speaker and the conveyor. Notwithstanding the greater accuracy of the written record, the speaker’s direct speech to his listeners is expressive of his intention more clearly than his reported speech by others. This would explain why some scholars fall into errors when they focus all their attention on text, and confine the process of deriving the rules (*ahkām*) of Shari‘ah from their source evidence to the minutia of textual analysis. Speakers and reporters admittedly vary on the score of accuracy, and certain types of speech are more open to interpretation than others, yet no text has, in any human language, been sufficient by itself to indicate the purpose of the speaker in such a way as to preclude all doubt.

Many writers have, for instance, reported Imam al-Shafi‘î to have said: “Whenever the authenticity of a hadith from the Messenger of God is verified, that is my *madhhab*.” This has prompted Ibn Ashur to comment that “a learned mujtahid is unlikely to make this kind of statement.” Available evidence from al-Shafi‘î and the Shafi‘î School leaves little doubt that it is distorted. For such an attribution to al-Shafi‘î can be taken to mean also that “when you see a ruling of my *madhhab* then know that it is tantamount to an authentic hadith.” Abd Allah bin Bayyah has similarly noted weaknesses in al-Shafi‘î textualist orientations. This is illustrated by a reference to al-Shafi‘î’s views concerning financial transactions during the
Prophet’s time, which were based on gold, silver and wheat as units of value. Al-Shafi’i has, in turn, considered this to be textually-ordained regardless of customary and circumstantial changes: What was the law then to al-Shafi’i must be the law today! Yet al-Shafi’i’s disciples have adjusted that position, Bin Bayyah adds, when they spoke of the reality of prevailing custom. The Shafi’i school has in reality undergone major changes in subsequent centuries, especially between the fourth to sixth centuries AD/tenth to twelfth CE partly due to the more rationalist influences of Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni and his disciple Abû Ḥamid al-Ghazâly (d. 1111). This only shows, Bin Bayyah concludes, the corrective influence of the maqāsid on ijtihad, which can hardly be overestimated, and that the position is hardly any different in our time.95

Ibn Ashur has also referred to what is attributed to Imam Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal that “a weak hadith is better than a ruling of analogy (qiyaṣ).”96 This too is unsound as a weak hadith carries the possibility of a lie and the harm of reliance on it is greater than what can arise from an analogy. We are therefore certain, Ibn Ashur stated, that the said statement is a distortion of what Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal has really said. This is enough to show how the true purpose of a reported statement, or a hadith, can be distorted if reliance is only made on written words in disconnect with what the speaker had originally intended.97

Another commentator essentially elaborates the same point to say that knowledge of maqāsid al-shari’ah is instrumental for a mujtahid in at least two situations: Firstly, when he undertakes ijtihad concerning interpretation of a speculative text (naṣṣ zannī al-dalālah) which is not self-contained as to its precise meaning. The text may be speculative with regard either to its meaning, or its authenticity, or both. Secondly, when the scholar conducts ijtihad over an issue on which no textual ruling exists in the first place. In both situations, the mujtahid needs to ascertain the maqāsid of Shari’ah as an aid to textual interpretation and ijtihad. The wording of a text may, moreover, convey a variety of meanings, and it is possible that one or more of these are in conflict with another text. To be able to ascertain the preferable meaning, the mujtahid would
certainly need to be knowledgeable of the higher purposes of Shari’ah.  

With reference to zakah (poor due), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah has discussed the different views of the ulama on whether the zakah on commodities such as wheat and dates must be given in kind or could it also be given in their monetary equivalents. The Hanafis have validated giving of zakah in monetary equivalents but al-Shafi’i has held otherwise. The Hanafi view is founded on the analysis that the purpose of zakah is to satisfy the need of the poor and this can also be achieved by paying the monetary equivalent of a commodity. Ibn Qayyim has likewise observed regarding the adaqat al-fi’r (charity given at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan) that there are hadiths on the subject which refer sometimes to dates and other times to raisins or food-grains as these were the staple food of Madinah and its environs at the time. The common purpose in all of these was to satisfy the need of the poor rather than to confine its payment in a particular commodity for all times.

To give another example, Imam Malik (d. 795) was asked about a person who paid his zakah ahead of time, that is, prior to the expiry of one year, whether he was liable to pay it again at the end of the year. Malik replied that he was and he drew an analogy with the ritual prayer (salah). If someone performs his prayer before its due time, he must perform it again in its proper time. Subsequent Malikis, including Ibn al-Arabi (d. 1148) and Ibn Rushd (d. 1126), have reversed this position and stated that early payment of zakah was permissible. There was, they added, a difference between salah and zakah in that the former was bound to specific times, but no such time had been stipulated for the payment of zakah. Hence zakah may be paid earlier, especially if it is prepaid by only a few weeks or even longer.

Mujtahids and judges have occasionally issued decisions in disputed matters, which were found, upon further scrutiny, to be discordant with the goals and objectives of Shari’ah. Instances of this are encountered with reference to contracts. A contract may have been duly signed and made binding on the parties but later it proves to be unfair to one of the parties due to unexpected change
of circumstances. In that eventuality the judge and mujtahid can hardly ignore the changes and insist merely on the obligatoriness of contract on purely formal grounds. For a contract is no longer the governing law of contracting parties if it proves to be unjust. Such a contract must be set aside, and justice, which is the goal and maqṣid of the Lawgiver, must be given priority over an untenable contract.\textsuperscript{101} Instances of conflict between the overriding objectives of Shari‘ah and a particular ruling thereof can also arise with reference to the rulings of analogy (qiyyās). A rigid adherence to qiyyās in certain cases may lead to unsatisfactory results, hence recourse may be had to considerations of equity (istihsān) in order to obtain an alternative ruling that is in harmony with objectives of Shari‘ah.\textsuperscript{102}

With reference to statutory law, Salim al-Awa has drawn attention to the strictures that emanate from the ever so prevailing “enslavement to the text (al-‘ubūdiyyah li‘l-nuṣūṣ)” that can be far removed from the true intent of the legislator. This manner of abiding by the text is all the more of a requirement when the legal text is explicit and conveys clear meaning. The Cassation Court of Egypt has thus held that reference to the purposes (maqṣid) of the law is made only when there is ambiguity in the text but not when the text is clear and unambiguous. Yet the same court has frequently emphasised the need to ascertain the intent and purpose of the legislator above and beyond the wordings of text.\textsuperscript{103}

The High Constitutional Court of Egypt has more emphatically upheld the importance for the judge and jurist of discovering the purposes of the legislature in the interpretation of a constitutional text. Yet it has also stressed that constitutional text should be read in light of socio-economic conditions that prevailed at the time of its enactment and not the ones that emerged long after that.\textsuperscript{104} On a comparative note, al-Awa also observed that the fiqh discourse on maqṣid is wider and pays attention to a structure of ideas, values and approaches that are often lacking in their parallel expositions of the era of binding statutory laws.\textsuperscript{105}

The late Lebanese scholar, Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, drew attention to the finite nature of the text of the Qur’an
and the Sunnah and the infinitude of actual real life issues experienced by individuals and societies at all times. The maqāsid evidently play a role in moderating the rigidities of a binding legal text. The limitations of a binding text can be meaningfully addressed, Sham al-Din recommends, through granting a more prominent role to maqāsid-oriented ijtihad.106

Another feature of the maqāsid which is important for ijtihad is the attention a mujtahid must pay to the end result and consequence of his ruling. For a fatwa or ijtihad would be deficient if it fails to contemplate its own consequences (ma’ālāt). We note in the Sunnah of the Prophet instances where the Prophet paid attention to the consequence of his ruling often in preference to other considerations. For example, the Prophet avoided changing the location of the Ka’bah to its original foundations which the patriarch Prophet Abraham had laid. The pre-Islamic Arabs of Makkah had evidently changed that location. When ‘Ā’ishah suggested to the Prophet that he could perhaps restore the Ka’bah to its original position, he responded: ‘I would have done so if I didn’t fear that this may induce our people into disbelief.’107 In this case, the Prophet evidently did not take what would be thought to be the normal course, that is, to restore the Ka’bah to its original foundations, because of the adverse consequences that were feared as a result of so doing.

The normal course in the context of crimes and penalties is to apply a punishment whenever the cause and occasion for it is present. There may be cases, however, where pardoning the offender appears a preferable course to take, and it is for the judge to pay attention to them and reflect them in his judgement. Al-Shāṭibī has in this connection drawn a subtle distinction between the normal ʾillah (effective cause) that invokes a particular ruling in a given case, and what he terms as verification of the particular ʾillah (taḥqīq al-manāṭ al-khāṣ) in the issuance of judgement and ijtihad. The scholar and mujtahid may be investigating the normal ʾillah and identify it based on the testimony, for example, of an upright witness, but such an enquiry may take a different course when he notes that the witness in question comes from a certain group, family or profession
that may render his testimony questionable. The judge needs, therefore, to be learned not only in the law and specific evidence, but also to have acumen and insight to render judgement that is enlightened by both the overall and special circumstances of each case.\textsuperscript{108}

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This essay has engaged in the methodology of \textit{maqāṣid} and the search for additional indicators for their identification as well as widening their scope and application to the broader civilisational objectives of Islam. The evidence I have presented and reviewed sustains the following policy recommendations:

- The Shari‘ah plays an instrumental role in negotiating the currents of reformist thought and perimeters of their acceptability in the Muslim world. Civilisational renewal can become a more engaging prospect if it is anchored in a suitable Shari‘ah jurisprudential framework, and the \textit{maqāṣid} serve to provide that.
- Civilisational renewal is broad and far-reaching, which may give rise to detailed issues that demand credible answers. The \textit{uṣūl} methodology has historically provided the criteria of credibility, yet it bears the vestiges of a different era and falls short of accommodating the demands of contemporary challenges facing the Ummah. Compared to the \textit{uṣūlī} doctrines, the \textit{maqāṣid} provide a more promising prospect and methodology to find valid Shari‘ah-based responses to such issues.
- Critics have often questioned the methodological accuracy and scope of \textit{maqāṣid}. This essay has discussed some of the weaknesses of the \textit{maqāṣid} methodology in an attempt to make it more engaging and self-contained. It does not, however, pretend to offer a comprehensive coverage of all issues. Some relevant issues have been addressed elsewhere in my previous works. Here I refer to three of my other publications: “Goals and Purposes (\textit{Maqāṣid}) of Shari‘ah: History and Methodology” (2008); “\textit{Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah Made Simple}” (2008); and “Law and Ethics in Islam: the Role of the \textit{Maqāṣid}” (2009).\textsuperscript{109}
We do not propose to sever the links between the *maqāṣid* and the *uṣūl al-fiqh*, but maintain that the one can benefit and enrich the other. Yet we also do not propose to subsume *maqāṣid* under the *uṣūl* methodology, which tends to be burdened with technicality. The *maqāṣid* provides an open and evolving chapter of the Shari‘ah that can grow in tandem with the needs and aspirations of today’s Muslims. Yet the *maqāṣid* can, in many ways, be enhanced and supplemented the rich methodology and resources of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

The desire to rejuvenate the dynamism of Islamic thought can be better served through *maqāṣid*-oriented ijtihad. Equipped with a credible methodology to ensure the proximity and nexus of *maqāṣid* with the scriptural guidelines of Islam, the *maqāṣid*-oriented ijtihad can provide a promising prospect for the advancement of a fresh genre of Islamic legal thought in conjunction with new and unprecedented developments. The *maqāṣid*-oriented ijtihad (al-ijtihad al-*maqāṣid*) may thus be seen as a bridge between the *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *maqāṣid*. It is suggested, therefore, that writers on the *maqāṣid* also take *maqāṣid* together with ijtihad as a framework for their scholarly deliberations and enhance our understanding of al-ijtihad al-*maqāṣid*.

*Maqāṣid* should be given adequate coverage in the university teaching programmes of Islamic jurisprudence. This is beginning to be the case generally, yet greater attention to *maqāṣid* that would reflect the current state of scholarship on the subject is still wanting.

Muslim leaders, parliamentarians and judges may be advised to take the *maqāṣid* as a basis of justification for legislative and judicial reforms that can enhance the substance of fruitful civilisational engagement and dialogue. This would make a meaningful contribution toward turning the tide of hostile overtures of the so-called ‘clash of civilisations’ towards peaceful coexistence and engagement, a prospect one hopes to be grounded in commitment to shared values.

Since the essential *maqāṣid* are all concerned with basic human welfare targets and speak of the protection of humanitarian
values, they have the potential to unite people across the religious and ethnic divides. This would, in turn, be meaningful to our quest to strengthen and enhance the substance of pluralism and human rights in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment of Malaysia and many other parts of the Muslim world.
NOTES


3 Mustaḥf Ahmad al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-‘Umūm (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1998), 1:392. Without engaging in technicalities, the uṣūl scholars define ʿillah as an attribute of the ḥukm which is constant and evident (ẓāhir) and bears a proper (munāṣib) relationship to the ruling of the text.


Notes


17 The *uṣūl* methods for identification of effective causes include *t takhrīj al-manāt* (extraction of the effective cause), *tangīl* (isolation of) al-manāt, and *taḥqīq* (ascertaining of) al-manāt, as well as a number of other methods that tend to run into technicalities. See for details, Kamali, *Principles* (chapter on *qiyās*).


19 For example, the right of preemption (*haqq al-shuf‘a*), and the ruling that a Muslim may not make an offer of betrothal to a woman who is already engaged to another person originate in the hadith.

20 This is the main reason why the numbering of *āyāt al-ahkām* also fluctuate from 200
Notes

to 350, 500, and even 600, by different writers depending on the degree of specification and restrictiveness that is applied in the selection.


23 Ibid., 130.

24 The hadith of *tas'īr* is recorded by Abu Dāwūd, *Sunan Abu Dāwūd* (various edns), hadith no. 3:457 – also recorded by Tirmidhī and Ibn Mājah.


26 al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, hadith no. 6764; and Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, hadith no. 1,614.


29 al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, hadith no. 294, and Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, hadith no. 1,211.


This third class (i.e. *juz’iyyah*) has also its correlative, namely *al-maqsāid al-kulliyyah*, or totalitarian purposes. However the last category is almost identical with ‘general purposes’—hence we combine the two classification into one that consist of three varieties.


See for details ibid.


This is the view of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī who validated maṣlahah only if it promoted the maqāsid.


This is the view of al-Juwāynī, al-Sarakhsi, al-Sulami and Ibn Taymiyyah. It is also noted that since Imam Mālik accepted maṣlahah mursalah as a basis of law and judgment, he can be assumed to have accepted ‘aql as a proof also of maqāsid. See for details Zaharuddin Abdul Rahman, *Maqāsid*, 102f.


Notes

52 Ibid., 2:117.
54 Ibn Ashur, Maqāsid, 58.
55 Ibid., 266.
56 Ibid., 268.
58 al-Shāṭībī, al-Muwāfaqāt, 2:385.
61 Ibn Ashur, Maqāsid, 64.
62 Ibid., 78.
64 Allal al-Fasi, Maqāsid, 41. See also Attia, Towards, 102–3.
65 al-Raysuni, Naẓāriyyat, 294f.
66 See for details on commands and prohibitions and their consequences Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles, 196f.
68 Auda, Maqāsid, 244.
69 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 63 – Soualhi’s quotation is from al-Shāṭībī, al-Muwāfaqāt, 2:51.
73 Soualhi only mentions some aspects of the usūl methodology for the identification of effective cause (masālik al-‘illah) in the context of qiyās. Some usūl texts, however, record close to forty conditions that the ‘illah must fulfil for it to be valid. To follow all of those would actually make qiyās and ‘illah both redundant as the new case (far) would to all intents and purposes have to be an exact replica of the original case (qiyās), in which case both the new and the original cases would fall under the law of (hukm) and no qiyās will be needed.
Notes

74 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatwāʾ, 32:134. See for further details also Kamali, Principles, 402f.
75 See for a summary of their views Attia, Towards, 79–86. See also Kamali, Principles, 401–2.
76 al-Qardawi, Madkhal, 75.
77 As quoted in Attia, Towards, 84 – excerpt from Siraj’s seminar paper on “Islamic Legal Priorities.”
78 Cf., Kamali, Principles, 402.
79 Ibn Ashur, Maqāsid, 139. See also Attia, Towards, 82.
80 Excerpt from al-Qardawi’s seminar paper on the Sunnah, as quoted in Attia, Towards, 84.
81 Quoted from Attia’s version of an excerpt from Muhammad al-Ghazali’s seminar paper on the subject of Islamic legal priorities with minor linguistic adjustments by the present writer; Attia, Towards, 83.
82 al-Raysuni, Nazariyyat, 47f.
83 Bin Bayyah, Maqāsid al-Shari‘ah, 52, 54.
89 Al-Shatibi, Muwaffaqat, II, 13–14; see also al-Khalifi in the previous note at p. 16.
91 Al-Tahir ibn Ashur, Maqāsid al-Shari‘ah, 15–16.
92 Ibid., 27.
93 Cf., Ibn Ashur, Maqāsid al-Shari‘ah (Messawi’s trans), (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1417/2007), 25. I have also consulted the original Arabic version of Ibn Ashur’s book for added verification.
94 Ibid., 25.
lecture was actually delivered at Alexandria University, Faculty of Law in February 2008.


102 See for details the chapter on *Istihsān* in Kamali, *Jurisprudence*.


104 Ibid., 268.

105 Ibid., 270.


